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Introduction
 Infrastructure is 1 of 17 sustainable 
development goals proposed by the United 
Nations and is a key consideration for 
developing countries seeking sustainable 
growth. The advancement of infrastructure 
can propel a nation to developed status and 
result in numerous spillover effects on its 
economy. More specifically, greater availability 
and quality of infrastructure in a developing 
country will foster economic growth via the 
attraction of capital inflows from foreign 
investors who view sound infrastructure as a 
desirable attribute in the investment decision-
making process. Foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which may come from individuals as well 
as public enterprises, private corporations, or 
governments, aims to establish a long-term and 
substantial level of influence on an enterprise or 
project in a foreign host country. FDI has been 
historically implemented as a key instrument in 
driving economic development (Duce). 
 With the South China Sea accounting for 
about a third of international trade, Southeast 
Asia quickly became a corridor for the 
resurgence of FDI post the 2008 global financial 
crisis. As a result, direct investors in world 
powers, such as the United States of America, 
Japan, and, in particular, the People’s Republic 
of China, have sought investment opportunities 
in the development of rapidly growing Southeast 
Asian economies. In 2013, China, using its 
leverage in the region, introduced a Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI), composed of about 65 
countries, to enhance connectivity between 
Eurasian countries via land and maritime routes 
(Cai). 
 Malaysia, a BRI participant and the third 
ranked country in Southeast Asia by gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, has grown 
at steady annual GDP growth rates between 
4% and 7% per year since 2010. In addition to 
its strong growth profile, Malaysia’s strategic 
location along the Strait of Malacca has made 
it a lucrative investment target for Chinese 
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BRI investors. In fact, China was Malaysia’s 
top source of FDI in 2017, accounting for 
approximately 7% of total inward FDI and 
clinching the lion’s share of construction FDI 
(Shukry and Ho). Notably, recent BRI projects 
are showcasing the inroads China is making in 
the Malaysian infrastructure sector. 
 China’s most significant construction 
investments in Malaysia have been in 
transportation systems, such as railway networks 
and ports. Examples of Chinese-funded mega 
projects in Malaysia include the Penang Second 
Bridge, the Malacca Gateway, and the East Coast 
Rail Link (ECRL). The economy of Malaysia 
appears to be highly dependent on Chinese 
investment, which is at an all-time high with 12 
recent Chinese-funded infrastructure projects 
across Malaysia, valued at an estimated RM242 
billion (Todd and Slattery). With bilateral 
trade partnerships and mega projects between 
China and Southeast Asian nations becoming 
increasingly prevalent, the nature of China’s 
business dealings in Malaysia has received 
increased press coverage. The large influx of 
Chinese investment has raised warning signals 
regarding China’s underlying investment 
rationale. Critics have suggested that Chinese 
investors are extending unsustainable long-term 
loans for infrastructure projects in developing 
countries such as Malaysia. While the lucrative 
terms and conditions surrounding Chinese 
FDI contracts are often tough to turn down, 
data suggest that Chinese-funded projects in 
Malaysia may not be win-win arrangements as 
the country copes with increased debt levels, 
evaluating new project quality and practicality, 
and maintaining autonomy from China’s 
massive sphere of influence (Todd and Slattery).
 In this article I discuss China’s investment 
influence on Malaysia and the associated 
ramifications, including concerns regarding 
a possible new colonialism centered around 
Chinese investment. I identify three main 
overarching themes—(1) debt traps, (2) 
transparency, and (3) financing—that revolve 
around the topic of debt sustainability. I also 
provide insights into the perceived superiority of 
Chinese construction and whether it is genuinely 
needed. Lastly, I propose some prescriptive 
guidelines if infrastructure investment projects 
are to be undertaken. 
A New Colonialism 
 As the most economically, strategically, 
and politically prominent country within Asia, 
China has established a regional sphere of 
influence and has recently designated Southeast 
Asia as a target for prospective BRI projects. A 
potential risk for sovereign nations is Chinese 
domination. Because of the rapid influx of 
investment, Southeast Asian countries should 
heed China’s previous controversial business 
practices in other countries used to spread its 
influence. 
 Malaysia should take note of China’s 
seizure of ownership of foreign infrastructure 
if the debtor country cannot comply with 
repayment terms. Perhaps the most glaring 
example is the case of Sri Lanka. The country has 
$55 billion in foreign debt, 10% of which is owed 
to Chinese lenders, and is operating at a 77% 
debt-to-GDP ratio. With little room to take on 
more debt and struggling to make repayments, 
in 2017, Sri Lanka ratified an agreement with a 
Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) to write 
off $1.1 billion worth of debt in exchange for a 
99-year lease of their Hambantota Port (Macan-
Markar). This transaction essentially provides 
China unfettered access to port facilities near 
one of its key Asian competitors, India. Malaysia 
may face similar consequences as the economies 
of China and Malaysia become more heavily 
interconnected. A potential global recession or 
an extraordinary domestic economic event may 
lead to the relinquishment of pivotal Malaysian 
infrastructure assets and gateways. The 
sequence of events in Sri Lanka has caused other 
BRI partners, including Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sierra Leone, to re-
evaluate investments that may be disguised as 
debt-trap diplomacy (Chandran).
 A 2019 Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) study concluded that most 
Southeast Asian nations are growing wary of 
China’s investment behavior in the region as 
developing countries take on more debt. More 
than 1,000 respondents from multiple sectors of 
society in all ten ASEAN member states, including 
146 respondents from Malaysia, participated in 
the survey. In response to the query, “What is 
your view of BRI proposals in your country?” 
a resounding 84.2% of surveyed Malaysians 
responded with, “My government should be 
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cautious to avoid getting into unsustainable 
financial debts with China” (Tang et al., p. 20). 
Similarly, 70% of all ASEAN respondents shared 
the same sentiment. Meanwhile, a mere 8.6% 
of the Malaysian survey respondents believed 
that the BRI benefits outweighed the potential 
economic and political fallout. Further, 5.8% 
of respondents believed that Malaysia should 
completely avoid participating in BRI projects. 
Indeed, the strong rhetoric of Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad has headlined the mass 
media and policy discussion spheres, causing 
doubt to creep into the minds of Malaysians 
as they step back and consider the potential 
negative ramifications of Chinese investment. 
Not surprisingly, Malaysia ranked highest 
among the ten ASEAN countries in terms of 
exercising caution towards Chinese investment 
as the survey was administered during talks to 
renegotiate the terms surrounding ECRL (Tang 
et al., p. 20).
Debt Sustainability
Debt Trap
 Under the BRI, China has expressed its 
intentions to invest trillions of dollars into the 
infrastructure of developing countries, but the 
question remains, At what financial cost to 
the recipients? The exact amount of debt owed 
to China is undisclosed, but China is a top 
contributor to Malaysia’s inward FDI and has 
financed several mega infrastructure projects 
in recent years. According to stress tests 
conducted by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), external debt would remain manageable 
under a variety of shocks. However, Malaysia’s 
debt levels hovered at just above median peer 
levels before the approval of two projects, 
which prompted conversation regarding 
the possibility of a credit-rating downgrade 
(“Malaysia…”).
 Soon after Mahathir was sworn in as 
Malaysia’s seventh Prime Minister in May of 
2018, he brought to national attention the 
immediate review of the ECRL. Agreed to 
under the previous administration by former 
Prime Minister Najib Razak, the ECRL was 
Chinese funded with a RM66 billion project 
cost. At the end of a 5-day visit to China in 
August 2018, Mahathir stated: “It’s all about 
borrowing too much money, which we cannot 
afford and cannot repay because we don’t 
need these projects in Malaysia” (Beech). The 
borrowing to which Mahathir referred is the 
approximately RM1 trillion total external debt 
that the country has accumulated, representing 
an estimated 62.5% of the country’s GDP in 
2018 (“Malaysia…”).
 After months of negotiations, in what 
could be viewed as either a victory or a 
concession, Mahathir ultimately reached 
a new deal to resume construction of the 
ECRL but at nearly two-thirds of the previous 
cost. The original RM66 billion project cost 
was negotiated down to RM44 billion ($10.7 
billion). Mahathir’s office was quoted: “This 
reduction will surely benefit Malaysia and 
lighten the burden on the country’s financial 
position” (Sipalan et al.). Although Mahathir 
may have succeeded in reducing the overall 
cost of the ECRL, details of the terms were 
not available, and the impending RM22 billion 
worth of compensation and penalty charges 
may have twisted his arm (“RM22 billion…”). 
Nevertheless, while project renegotiations 
are a step in the right direction for Malaysia, 
the financial burden on the country remains 
ambiguous.
 Nations with developing economies 
require a balance between early investment 
in infrastructure to support future economic 
growth and stable revenue generation to be able 
to service the resulting debt. Without adequate 
oversight, a self-fulfilling debt prophecy can 
emerge if a highly leveraged country initially 
struggles to make debt repayments, thus 
leading to a higher cost of capital as future 
investors seek appropriate compensation for 
the risks they are taking on (Nicolini). In other 
words, Malaysia may find itself having to pay a 
premium on future projects if its debt-to-GDP 
ratio vastly increases. Fortunately, Malaysia 
has surpassed the early stages of development 
and can exercise investment discretion as 
the country undergoes rapid economic 
development. 
Transparency
 The lack of public transparency 
surrounding the financing of Chinese BRI 
loans is indicative of a nation that seeks to 
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acquire advantages when negotiating with 
sovereign governments. Apart from infrequent 
official media announcements of new BRI 
projects that may reveal top line costs, Chinese 
creditors do not publish cross-border financing 
agreements or terms for their BRI projects nor 
does a centralized public database exist for 
such information. Additionally, finding BRI 
project details published by the debtor nation 
is unlikely. China’s main funding sources for 
2016 BRI projects, including loans or equity 
investments, are China’s four main state-
owned commercial banks (Bank of China, 
China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank 
of China, and Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China), the China Development Bank, and 
the Export-Import Bank of China, accounting 
for 51.4%, 37.7%, and 8.2% of total funding, 
respectively (Wildau and Ma). Unlike China’s 
three main BRI funding sources, multilateral 
lending institutions, such as the World Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank, the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, and most 
bilateral development finance institutions, 
publish the terms of loans to governments for 
all to see. Because of the lack of transparency 
and access to BRI loan data, financing terms 
are not widely available to be analyzed and 
compared. Currently, there are insufficient data 
available for analysts to calculate the amount 
of debt a country like Malaysia owes to China, 
and some nations potentially are receiving 
more favorable terms than others. With China 
becoming a bigger player in the developmental 
assistance of other nations, it should comply 
with worldwide common practices of lending 
transparency facilitated via multilateral 
agreements. The lack of transparency should, at 
the very least, raise doubts about the financial 
viability of the transactions and, indeed, the 
projects themselves. 
 Twenty-two of the world’s largest creditor 
nations, including Japan, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom, are permanent members of 
the Paris Club, an informal group of nations 
with a common objective of developing 
solutions to aid debtor nations struggling to 
service their debt. The organization is grounded 
on a multilateral approach to debt relief with 
observers that include the IMF, the World Bank, 
and many other international institutions. 
China, the world’s third largest international 
creditor, however, has often favored bilateral 
methods to solving default matters and has 
chosen to be only an ad hoc participant in the 
Paris Club (Hurley et al., p. 22). Therefore, 
China does not have to adhere to the Paris 
Club principles of solidarity, consensus, 
and, most importantly, information sharing. 
Without multilateral agreements, China deals 
exclusively with the debtor country to resolve 
its debt circumstances, and, although there 
are public data provided by the IMF regarding 
Chinese debt relief actions, for the most part, 
Chinese creditors work with their debtors on 
a case-by-case basis. Unlike the permanent 
members of the Paris Club, Chinese creditors 
are not obliged to reveal information regarding 
the management of credit restructurings or 
negotiations. 
Financing
 Although there is an established 
relationship between China and Malaysia, the 
financing terms on project loans provided by 
Chinese creditors distribute the majority of 
the financial risk onto Malaysia and, at times, 
favor Chinese over Malaysian firms. Malaysia’s 
construction sector continues to grow at a 
healthy rate, despite a large percentage of 
contracts granted to Chinese organizations. 
Widely criticized as unfair to local and non-
Chinese foreign investors, China’s SOEs offer 
extremely favorable pricing and financing 
options in exchange for Malaysian construction 
contracts. Recently, Chinese SOEs have taken 
advantage of Chinese state funding by offering 
lucrative loan terms, such as longer grace and 
repayment periods, that are below market 
interest rates (Massa, p. 11). Considering that 
a majority of Chinese contractors employed in 
Malaysia are SOEs, Malaysia is familiar with 
the terms and has at times prioritized Chinese 
contractors, such as the direct negotiation 
with China Communications Construction 
Company (CCCC) for the ECRL project. 
Massive SOEs, such as CCCC, China Harbour 
Engineering Corporation, and China Railway 
Construction Corporation, acquire financing 
via state-owned banks. Advantageous export 
credit insurance is also provided by the state-
owned China Export & Credit Insurance 
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Corporation (Massa, p. 4). Ultimately, because 
Malaysia runs a budget deficit, its main source 
of current and future funding must come from 
private or foreign funds, and Chinese lenders 
possess the financing to gain a competitive 
advantage over local and non-Chinese foreign 
lenders.
 Chinese contractors are able to attain 
such favorable financing in part because 
China is not a member of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and therefore is not forced to follow 
OECD guidelines. The guidelines would 
have influenced the quantity of Chinese aid 
allowed, credit practices and repayment terms, 
and the exchange of information and would 
have imposed social, environmental, and 
governance standards on Chinese financing 
activities. OECD member nations are limited 
on the conditions and terms surrounding 
export credit financing in order to provide a 
fair playing field where the quality and price of 
service are favored over preferential financing 
terms. Since Chinese firms are able to achieve 
such preferential financing, they are able to 
tolerate low margins and beat out Malaysian 
contractors that cannot guarantee such terms 
(Massa, p. 17).
 Malaysia does welcome construction 
tenders from all countries, including China, 
and, in most cases, the government negotiates 
clauses requiring foreign contractors to 
subcontract local contractors for 30% of the 
project. However, 30% is still a minority, 
and Chinese contractors have been known 
to exclusively award subcontracts to other 
Chinese corporations. The reality is that 
Chinese corporations have the capacity to take 
on various sizeable projects, and when they 
must subcontract, they more often than not 
contract other Chinese companies with whom 
they are familiar because of similar working 
practices and costs. The losers in this scenario 
are local and other foreign contractors (Todd 
and Slattery). Although the terms provided 
by Chinese financing are attractive, Malaysia 
may be doing a disservice to its own local 
construction enterprises and forgoing 
potentially higher-quality projects by settling 
for the lowest bidder.
Is Chinese Infrastructure  
Quality Superior?
 China’s BRI serves as a tool to generate 
more business for Chinese engineering and 
construction companies at a time when “over 
half the infrastructure investments in China 
made in the last three decades have been 
[net present value] negative” (Ansar et al., p. 
377). (Net present value refers to the current 
value of all future cash flows generated by 
a certain project.) According to Ansar and 
colleagues, “China’s track record in delivering 
infrastructure is no better than that of rich 
democracies” (p. 360). In fact, there are media 
reports describing Chinese infrastructure 
investments in Africa as subpar in quality. 
Analysis of the outcome of infrastructure 
projects completed by Chinese firms within 
China itself reveals that investment in 
infrastructure has actually deteriorated 
economic value in China “due to poor 
management of risks that impact cost, time, 
and benefits.” (Ansar et al., p. 377). As a result, 
China’s own crumbling infrastructure has 
become a priority concern for the government.
 In summary, there is no significant 
empirical evidence suggesting a difference in 
the performance of Chinese firms compared to 
OECD country firms between 2000 and 2013 
(Farrell, p. 7). An ASEAN survey indicated that 
28.7% of Malaysians believe that it is actually 
“too early to analyze impacts of BRI projects 
due to lack of information” (Tang et al., p. 
19). From a project management standpoint, 
China may offer lower tender rates than other 
countries for projects, but evidence suggests 
that the work itself is not necessarily of better 
quality, with some associated evidence of 
inferior quality.
White Elephant Projects
 White elephant projects are those that 
typically arise from corrupt or opaque approval 
systems in which the high capital cost of a 
project outweighs the long-term usefulness or 
value of the project. The rhetoric surrounding 
white elephant projects has escalated since the 
removal of the Najib-led government and the 
election of current Prime Minister Mahathir. 
For instance, Pacific Asia economists such as 
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Alex Holmes have suggested that the current 
infrastructure system in Malaysia is satisfactory 
for a developed economy and that recent 
investment influxes into port infrastructure 
may lead to oversupply and inflation (White). 
Malaysia must be cautious when entertaining 
expensive foreign-funded projects that come 
with dubious economic value and that may 
prove to be underutilized in the future. 
Mahathir has criticized, postponed, or 
reevaluated potential white elephant projects 
such as the high-speed rail (HSR) to Singapore 
and the ECRL. 
 In late May of 2018 following the general 
election, Mahathir began to ratchet up the 
criticism of high-priced rail projects in Malaysia 
as he publicly doubted their economic viability. 
In his view, the proposed HSR running between 
Singapore and Malaysia would not be beneficial 
to Malaysia because it will cost a huge sum of 
money and save passengers only approximately 
1 hour in travel time (Bland and Mallet). The 
backlash from halting the project was mixed, 
but Mahathir insists on ensuring the future 
financial stability of Malaysia. In an interview 
with The New York Times, Mahathir also 
claimed that he had evidence that the ECRL 
could have been built by a local company for 
about half of the RM55 billion ($13.4 billion) 
sum his predecessor agreed to pay China-
owned CCCC (Beech). Clearly, Mahathir has 
been critical of dubious investments agreed to 
under the previous administration for projects 
where he does not quite see the need. There is 
no hard evidence to back the Prime Minister’s 
claim, and he ultimately agreed to a final project 
cost of RM44 billion ($10.7 billion). However, 
the lack of public feasibility studies and limited 
disclosure on financing terms on those China-
related projects is worrisome and cause for 
concern, perhaps justifying Mahathir’s views.
 Widespread criticism of steeply priced 
infrastructure projects in Malaysia in the early 
half of 2018 coincided with a massive ongoing 
investigation into malfeasance at Malaysia’s 
state-owned investment fund, 1Malaysia 
Development Berhad (1MDB), a fund that was 
intended to attract foreign investment and 
came under scrutiny for at least RM16.45 billion 
($4 billion) in irregular transactions. Several 
infrastructure projects taken on during Najib’s 
administration may have been linked to the 
1MDB scandal according to Malaysian Minister 
of Finance Lim Guan Eng. For example, the 
ECRL was said to have an exorbitant price tag 
despite favorable comparisons made by Najib 
concerning the higher costs of other railways. 
In reality, the economics of railway projects 
should be evaluated independently and should 
not be compared directly due to differences 
in geography, technology, and construction 
time frame. Proponents of the ECRL claim 
that the railway system will “upgrade east-west 
connectivity, help boost economic development 
along the east coast and improve the well-
being of residents in Pahang, Terengganu 
and Kelantan” (Foon). However, the HSR 
and ECRL will only enhance, not pioneer, 
this connectivity, and, according to a survey 
conducted by the Malaysian National News 
Agency, Bernama, many road users would 
prefer upgrades to the existing roads instead 
of the ECRL (Latib). Additionally, because of 
the lack of transparency, logistics analysts note 
that no Chinese firm has agreed to support the 
railroad and that freight costs will likely deter 
any substitution effects, unless government 
subsidies are provided (Yean). 
 In order to avoid building so-called 
bridges to nowhere, Malaysia should 
implement a mandatory procedure grounded 
on a transparent appraisal and approval 
system. Implementing a robust procurement 
process will ensure that every proposed 
project passes through a system of checks 
and balances whereby the project in question, 
especially those contracted at a state level, 
will have to align with Malaysia’s overarching 
developmental goals. This will prevent one-off 
type projects that are not consistent with the 
country’s holistic development plan. Further, 
such a process will help in adopting financing 
that will support the time sensitivity of projects 
and ensure that programs to guarantee 
technology transfer, local employment, and so 
forth are set in place. 
Conclusion
 As the first ASEAN country to establish 
diplomatic relations with China, Malaysia has 
had a history of strongly rooted economic 
and political ties with that country. Over 
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many decades, the bilateral relationship has 
contributed to the strengthening of trade and 
investment, either through direct investment 
or via joint venture collaborations. Until 
recently, Malaysia could have been considered 
a success story of an Asian democratic nation 
with a rapidly growing economy, despite 
Chinese political and economic influence. To 
be clear, Chinese investment in Malaysia is not 
entirely detrimental, and Malaysia should not 
be entirely opposed to it. Malaysia could benefit 
from a sustainable and transparent two-way 
investment relationship with China. 
 There are three main factors that Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister should address before moving 
forward with Chinese investment dealings 
while maintaining cordial ties. First, current 
dubious investment projects should be halted 
and comprehensive evaluations, from both 
financial and feasibility perspectives, should 
take place. Second, full transparency and 
accountability standards should be followed by 
nations seeking to invest in Malaysia and by the 
Malaysian ministry responsible for sponsoring 
the project. This will allow for an impartial 
procurement process where all parties involved 
are fully aware of the details of the transaction. 
Third, the implementation of statewide 
governance and regulatory criteria will serve 
as a tool to eliminate the possibility of white 
elephant projects and ensure the development 
of economically viable projects that will deliver 
dividends to Chinese and Malaysian investors 
and to Malaysian communities. Ultimately, 
the Mahathir administration will have a fine 
line to walk, but, with sustainable investment 
standards set in place and proper evaluations 
of project practicality, Malaysia can realize 
sustained growth with minimized risk.
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